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Abstract—Offloading computation to a mobile cloud is a
promising solution to augment the computation capabilities
of mobile devices. In this paper we consider selfish mobile
devices in a dense wireless network, in which individual
mobile devices can offload computations via multiple access
points (APs) to a mobile cloud so as to minimize their com-
putation costs, and we provide a game theoretical analysis
of the problem. We show that in the case of an elastic cloud,
all improvement paths are finite, and thus a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium exists and can be computed easily. In the
case of a non-elastic cloud we show that improvement paths
may cycle, yet we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists
and we provide an efficient algorithm for computing one.
Furthermore, we provide an upper bound on the price of
anarchy (PoA) of the game. We use simulations to evaluate
the time complexity of computing Nash equilibria and to
provide insights into the PoA under realistic scenarios. Our
results show that the equilibrium cost may be close to
optimal, and the cost difference is due to too many mobile
users offloading simultaneously.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile handsets are increasingly used for various com-
putationally intensive applications, including augmented
reality, natural language processing, face, gesture and
object recognition, and various forms of user profiling for
recommendations [1], [2]. Executing such computationally
intensive applications on mobile handsets may result in
slow response times, and can also be detrimental to battery
life, which may limit user acceptance.
Mobile cloud computing has emerged as a promis-
ing solution to serve the computational needs of these
computationally intenstive applications, while potentially
relieving the battery of the mobile handsets [3], [4]. In
the case of mobile cloud computing the mobile devices
offload the computations via a wireless network to a cloud
infrastructure, where the computations are performed, and
the result is sent back to the mobile handset. While
computation offloading to general purpose cloud infras-
tructures, such as Amazon EC2, may not be able to provide
sufficiently low response times for many applications,
emerging mobile edge computing resources may provide
sufficient computational power close to the network edge
to meet all application requirements [5].
Computation offloading to a mobile edge cloud can
significantly increase the computational capability of indi-
vidual mobile handsets, but the response times may suffer
when many handsets attempt to offload computations to
the cloud simultaneously, on the one hand due to the com-
petition for possibly constrained edge cloud resources, on
the other hand due to contention in the wireless access [6],
[7]. The problem is even more complex in the case of a
dense deployment of access points, e.g., cellular femtocells
or WiFi access points, when each mobile user can choose
among several access points to connect to. Good system
performance in this case requires the coordination of the
offloading choices of the indvidual mobile handsets, while
respecting their individual performance objectives, both in
terms of response time and energy consumption.
In this paper we consider the problem of resource
allocation for computation offloading by self-interested
mobile users to a mobile cloud. The objective of each
mobile user is to minimize a linear combination of its
response time and its energy consumption for performing a
computational task, by choosing whether or not to offload
through one of many access points. Clearly, the choice
of a mobile user affects the cost of other mobile users.
If too many mobile users choose offloading through a
particular access point then they will achieve low trans-
mission rate. A low transmission rate would lead to high
data transmission time and a corresponding high energy
consumption. In order to capture the interactions between
the choices of the mobile users, in this paper we formulate
the computation offloading problem as a non-cooperative
game, and address the existence of self-enforcing resource
allocations, i.e., equilibrium allocations, and their compu-
tation.
Our contibutions in this paper are threefold. First, we
show that if the cloud computing resources scale with
the number of mobile users then equilibrium allocations
always exist, and we provide a simple algorithm for
computing an equilibrium. Second, we show that if the
cloud computing resources do not scale with the number
of mobile users then the same algorithm cannot be used
for computing an equilibrium as it may cycle infinitely,
but we prove that equilibria exist, and we provide an
algorithm with quadratic complexity in the number of
mobile users for computing an equilibrium. Finally, we
provide a bound on the price of anarchy for both models
of cloud resources. We provide numerical results based
on extensive simulations to illustrate the computational
efficiency of the algorithms and to evaluate the price of
anarchy for scenarios of practical interest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model in Section II. We prove equilibrium
existence and computability results for the elastic cloud
and non-elastic cloud in Sections III and IV, respectively.
We provide a bound on the price of anarchy in Section V
and present numerical results in Section VI. Section VII
discusses related work and Section VIII concludes the
paper.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a mobile cloud computing system that
serves a set K={1, 2, ...,K} of colocated mobile users
(MU). Each MU has a computationally intensive task
to perform, and can decide whether to perform the task
locally or to offload the computation to a cloud server.
The computational task is characterized by the size Dk
of the input data (e.g., in bytes), and by the number Lk
of the CPU cycles required to perform the computation.
To enable a meaningful analysis, we make the common
assumption that the set of MUs does not change during
computation offloading, i.e., in the order of seconds [4],
[8], [9], [10].
A. Communication model
If the MU decides to offload the computation to the
cloud server, it has to transmit Dk amount of data per-
taining to its task to the cloud server through one of a set
of access points (APs) denoted by I={1, 2, ..., I}. Thus,
together with local computing MU k can choose an action
from the set Dk={0, 1, 2, ..., I}, where 0 corresponds to
local computing, i.e., no offloading. We denote by dk∈Dk
the decision of MU k, and refer to it as her strategy. We
refer to the collection d = (dk)k∈K as a strategy profile,
and we denote by D = ×k∈KDk the set of all feasible
strategy profiles.
We denote by Bi the bandwidth of AP i, and for a
strategy profile d we denote by ni(d) the number of MUs
that use AP i for computation offloading, and by n(d)=∑
i∈I ni(d) the number of MUs that offload. Similarily,
for an AP i ∈ I we denote by Oi(d) = {k|dk = i} the
set of MUs that offload using AP i, and we define the set
of offloaders as O(d) = ∪i∈IOi(d). We consider that the
bandwidth Bi of AP i is divided equally among the users
that are connecting to it, i.e., the uplink rate Rik(d) of MU
k is given by
Rik(d) =
Bi
ni(d)
. (1)
The model of equal bandwidth sharing is reasonable if
MUs are colocated, or if the APs implement fair uplink
bandwidth allocation [11], [12].
The uplink rate Rik(d) together with the input data size
Dk determines the transmission time T
c,off
k,i (d) of MU k
for offloading via AP i,
T c,offk,i (d) =
Dk
Rik(d)
. (2)
To model the energy consumption of the MUs, we assume
that MU k uses a constant transmit power of Pk for
sending the data, thus the energy consumption of MU k
for offloading the input data of size Dk via AP i is
Eck,i(d) =
DkPk
Rik(d)
. (3)
B. Computation model
In what follows we introduce our model of the time
and energy consumption of performing the computation
locally and in the cloud server.
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elastic cloud (Fc = Fc)k
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Fig. 1. An example of a mobile cloud computing system
1) Local computing: In the case of local computing
data need not be transmitted, but the task has to be
processed using local computing power. We denote by F 0k
the computational capability of MU k, and express the
time it takes for MU k to perform the computation task
<Dk, Lk> locally by
T 0k =
Lk
F 0k
. (4)
In order to model the energy consumption of local com-
puting we denote by vk the consumed energy per CPU
cycle, thus we obtain
E0k = vkLk. (5)
2) Cloud computing: In the case of cloud computing,
after the data are transmitted via an AP, processing is
done at the cloud server. We denote the computation
capability of the cloud by F c, and by F ck the computation
capability assigned to MU k by the cloud. We consider
two models of scaling for the computational capability
of the cloud. In the elastic model each MU that offloads
receives F ck = F
c amount of computing power, which is
a resonable assumption for large cloud computing infras-
tructures. In the non-elastic model an MU that offloads
is assigned F ck (d) = F c/n(d) computation capability,
i.e., the computing power is shared equally among all
MUs that offload, which may be a reasonable model of
emerging mobile edge cloud infrastructures with limited
computational power and scaling [5].
Given F ck we use a linear model to compute the
execution time of a task <Dk, Lk> that is offladed by
MU k,
T c,exek =
Lk
F ck
. (6)
Figure 1 shows an example of a mobile cloud computing
system that consists of I = 3 APs and K = 5 MUs
in which MUs a and c offload using AP 1, MU b
offloads using AP 2, and MUs d and e perform the local
computation.
C. Cost Model
We consider that the cost of an MU can be modeled
as a linear combination of the time it takes to finish the
computation and its energy consumption. For MU k we
denote by γEk the weight attributed to energy consumption
and by γTk the weight attributed to the time it takes to finish
the computation, 0 ≤ γEk < γTk ≤ 1.
Using these notation, for the case of local computing
the cost of MU k is determined by the local computing
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time and the corresponing energy consumption,
C0k = γ
T
k T
0
k + γ
E
k E
0
k = (
γTk
F 0k
+ γEk vk)Lk. (7)
For the case of offloading the cost is determined by the
transmission time, the corresponding transmit energy, and
the computing time in the cloud,
Cck,i(d) = γ
T
k (T
c,exe
k + T
c,off
k,i (d)) + γ
E
k E
c
k,i(d)
= (γTk + γ
E
k Pk)
Dk
Rik(d)
+ γTk
Lk
F ck
. (8)
Similar to previous works [7], [13], [14], we do not model
the time needed to transmit the results of the computation
from the cloud server to the MU, as for typical applications
like face and speech recognition, the size of the result of
the computation is much smaller than Dk.
For notational convenience let us define the indicator
function I(dk, i) for MU k as
I(dk, i)=
{
1, if dk = i
0, otherwise. (9)
We can then express the cost of MU k in strategy profile
d as
Ck(d) = C0kI(dk, 0) +
∑
i∈I
Cck,i(d)I(dk, i). (10)
D. Computation Offloading Game
We consider that the objective of each MU is to mini-
mize its cost (10), i.e., to find a strategy
d∗k ∈ arg min
dk∈Dk
Ck(dk, d−k), (11)
where we use d−k to denote the strategies of all MUs
except MU k. Clearly, the strategy of an MU influences
the cost of the other MUs, and thus we can model the
problem as a strategic game Γ =< K, (Dk)k, (Ck)k >, in
which the players are the MUs. We refer to the game as the
computation offloading game. We are interested in whether
cost minimizing MUs can reach a strategy profile in which
no MU can further decrease her cost through changing her
strategy, i.e., a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ.
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium (NE) of the strategic
game <K, (Dk)k, (Ck)k> is a strategy profile d∗ such
that
Ck(d
∗
k, d
∗
−k) ≤ Ck(dk, d∗−k).
Given a strategy profile (dk, d−k) we say that strategy
d′k is an improvement step for MU k if Ck(d
′
k, d−k) <
Ck(dk, d−k). We call a sequence of improvement steps
in which one MU changes her strategy at a time an
improvement path. Furthermore, we say that a strategy
d∗k is a best reply to d−k if it solves (11), and we call
an improvement path in which all improvement steps are
best reply a best improvement path. Observe that in a NE
all MUs play their best replies to each others’ strategies.
In the rest of the paper we investigate whether NE
exist for the elastic and for the non-elastic cloud model,
and whether the MUs can compute a NE efficiently using
distributed algorithms.
III. EQUILIBRIA IN CASE OF AN ELASTIC CLOUD
Recall that under the elastic cloud model the cloud
computation capability assigned to user k is independent
of the other players’ strategies, F ck = F
c. Thus, the cost
function in the case of offloading can be expressed as
Cck,i(d) = (γ
T
k + γ
E
k Pk)Dk
ni(d)
Bi
+ γTk
Lk
F c
. (12)
We start with formulating an insightful structural result
about the best responses of the MUs, which we will use
later to prove the existence of NE.
Lemma 1. Given the strategy profile d−k of the MUs
other than k in the computation offloading game with
elastic cloud, a best reply d∗k of user k satisfies the
following threshold strategy
d∗k =
0, if Mk ≤
ni(i,d−k)
Bi
for ∀i ∈ I
i, if ni(i,d−k)Bi ≤ min
{
Mk, min
j∈I\{i}
nj(j,d−k)
Bj
}
(13)
where
Mk =
γEk vk + γ
T
k (
1
F 0k
− 1F c )
γTk + γ
E
k Pk
· Lk
Dk
.
Proof: Based on (7), (9), (10) and (12), the cost of
MU k when choosing dk is
Ck(dk, d−k) = C0kI(dk, 0) +
I∑
i=1
Cck,i(dk, d−k)I(dk, i)
=
(
(
γTk
F 0k
+ γEk vk)Lk
)
I(dk, 0)
+
I∑
i=1
(
(γTk + γ
E
k Pk)Dk
ni(i, d−k)
Bi
+ γTk
Lk
F c
)
I(dk, i).
Let us first consider the case that the best reply of MU
k is d∗k = 0. We then have that Ck(0, d−k) ≤ Ck(i, d−k)
for every AP i ∈ I, which implies that
(
γTk
F 0k
+ γEk vk)Lk ≤ (γTk + γEk Pk)Dk
ni(i, d−k)
Bi
+ γTk
Lk
F c
.
After algebraic manipulations we obtain
Mk ,
γEk vk + γ
T
k (
1
F 0k
− 1F c )
γTk + γ
E
k Pk
· Lk
Dk
≤ ni(i, d−k)
Bi
.
Let us now consider the case when the best reply of MU
k is d∗k = i. We then have that Ck(i, d−k) ≤ Ck(0, d−k)
and Ck(i, d−k) ≤ Ck(j, d−k) for every AP j ∈ I \ {i}.
Following the same reasoning as above, it is easy to see
that Ck(i, d−k) ≤ Ck(0, d∗−k) implies that ni(i,d−k)Bi ≤
Mk. It is easy to see that nj(j, d−k) = nj(i, d−k) + 1,
and thus Ck(i, d∗−k) ≤ Ck(j, d∗−k) implies that
(γTk + γ
E
k Pk)Dk
ni(i, d−k)
Bi
≤ (γTk + γEk Pk)Dk
nj(j, d−k)
Bj
which is equivalent to
ni(i, d−k)
Bi
≤ nj(j, d−k)
Bj
.
The above threshold strategy allows players to compute
their best and better replies efficiently. In what follows we
show that the computation offloading game with elastic
cloud admits a NE, and a NE can be computed by iterative
computation of the players’ better or best replies, i.e.,
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following an improvement path. Before we formulate the
theorem, let us recall the definition of a generalized ordinal
potential from [15].
Definition 2. A function Φ : ×Dk → R is a gener-
alized ordinal potential function for the strategic game
< K, (Dk)k, (Ck)k > if for an arbitrary strategy profile
(dk, d−k) and for any corresponding improvement step d′k
it holds that
Ck(d
′
k, d−k)−Ck(dk, d−k) < 0⇒
Φ(d′k, d−k)− Φ(dk, d−k) < 0.
Theorem 1. The computation offloading game with elastic
cloud admits the generalized ordinal potential function
Φ(d) =
I∑
m=1
nm(d)∑
n=1
n
Bm
+
K∑
s=1
MsI(ds, 0), (14)
and hence it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: To prove that Φ(d) is a generalized ordi-
nal potential function, we first show that Ck(i, d−k) <
Ck(0, d−k) implies Φk(i, d−k) < Φk(0, d−k) for a
MU k. According to (7), (10) and (12), the condition
Ck(i, d−k) < Ck(0, d−k) implies that
ni(i, d−k)
Bi
< Mk (15)
for the strategy profile (i, d−k) it holds that
Φ(i, d−k) =
ni(i,d−k)∑
n=1
n
Bi
+
∑
m6=i
nm(i,d−k)∑
n=1
n
Bm
+
∑
s6=k
MsI(ds, 0),
and for the strategy profile (0, d−k)
Φ(0, d−k) =
ni(0,d−k)∑
n=1
n
Bi
+
∑
m6=i
nm(0,d−k)∑
n=1
n
Bm
+Mk +
∑
s6=k
MsI(ds, 0).
Since ni(i, d−k) = ni(0, d−k) + 1, we obtain
Φ(i, d−k)− Φ(0, d−k) = ni(i, d−k)
Bi
−Mk.
It follows from (15) that Φ(i, d−k) − Φ(0, d−k) < 0.
Similarly, we can show that Ck(0, d−k) < Ck(i, d−k)
implies Φk(0, d−k) < Φk(i, d−k).
Second, we show that Ck(i, dk) < Ck(j, dk) implies
Φk(i, dk) < Φk(j, dk) for a MU k. According to (10)
and (12), the condition Ck(i, dk) < Ck(j, dk) implies that
ni(i, dk)
Bi
<
nj(j, dk)
Bj
(16)
Let us rewrite Φ by separating the terms for APs i and j,
Φ(i, d−k) =
ni(i,d−k)∑
n=1
n
Bi
+
nj(i,d−k)∑
n=1
n
Bj
+
∑
m6=i,j
nm∑
n=1
n
Bm
+
∑
s 6=k
MsI(ds, 0). (17)
Since ni(i, d−k) = ni(j, d−k) + 1 and nj(j, d−k) =
nj(i, d−k) + 1, we have that
Φ(i, d−k)− Φ(j, d−k) = ni(i, d−k)
Bi
− nj(j, d−k)
Bj
.
It follows from (16) that Φ(i, d−k)−Φ(j, d−k) < 0, which
proves the theorem.
The existence of a generalized ordinal potential allows
us to formulate a simple algorithm for computing a Nash
equilibrium by leveraging the fact that in a game that all
improvement paths are finite, i.e., lead to a Nash equilib-
rium, in a finite strategic game that admits a generalized
ordinal potential function [15].
Corollary 1. Starting from an arbitrary initial strategy
profile, let one MU at a time perform an improvement
step iteratively. The algorithm terminates in a NE after a
finite number of steps for the computation offloading game
with elastic cloud.
IV. EQUILIBRIA IN CASE OF A NON-ELASTIC CLOUD
In the case of a non-elastic cloud the computation
capability F ck that is assigned to MU k in the cloud server
depends on the other MUs’ strategies, and thus the cost
function in case of offloading can be expressed as
Cck,i(d) = (γ
T
k + γ
E
k Pk)Dk
ni(d)
Bi
+ γTk
Lk
F c
n(d). (18)
A natural question is whether a generalized ordinal poten-
tial similar to (14) exists in the case of non-elastic cloud, in
which case all improvement paths would be finite. We first
show that if we only allow MUs to change between APs,
but we do not allow them to start or to stop offloading,
then this holds.
Lemma 2. Consider an arbitrary strategy profile d, and
consider that (i) the improvement step d′k of MU k ∈ O(d)
is constrained to d′k ∈ I, and (ii) MUs k 6∈ O(d)
are not allowed to perform improvement steps. Then all
improvement paths that satisfy constraints (i) and (ii) are
finite.
Proof: First, observe that the set O(d) of offloaders is
unchanged during an improvement path with constraints (i)
and (ii). For a strategy profile d let vector γ(d) ∈ R|O(d)|≥0
contain the cost Ck(d) for MUs k ∈ O(d) in decreasing
order. Let d′ = (d′k, d−k) be the strategy profile after an
improvement step made by MU k that satisfies constraint
(i), and let i = dk and j = d′k. Since
nj(d)+1
Bj
< ni(d)Bi
must hold for the change of APs to be an improvement
step, we have γ(d′) ≺L γ(d), where ≺L stands for
lexicographically smaller. Since γ(d) decreases in the
lexiographical sense upon every improvement step, and
the number of strategy profiles is finite, the improvement
paths must be finite.
Thus, if MUs can only change between APs, they
terminate after a finite number of improvement steps.
Unfortunately, as the following example shows, this is not
the case if MUs can decide not to offload, and thus the
algorithm in Corrollary 1 cannot be used to compute a
NE, even if a NE exists.
Example 1. Consider a computation offloading game
with non-elastic cloud where K = {a, b, c, d, e} and
I = {1, 2, 3} as illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows a
cyclic improvement path starting from the strategy profile
(1, 2, 1, 0, 0), in which MUs a and c are connected to AP
1, MU b is connected to AP 2 and MUs d and e perform
local computation.
4
dk da db dc dd de
d(0) 1 2 1 0 0
d(1) 1 2 2 0 0
d(2) 1 0 2 0 0
d(3) 1 0 2 2 0
d(4) 1 0 2 2 2
d(5) 1 0 1 2 2
d(6) 1 3 1 2 2
d(7) 1 3 1 2 0
d(8) 1 3 1 0 0
d(9) 1 2 1 0 0
B2>B1 (1)
2
B2
(γTb +γ
E
b Pb)Db+3γ
T
b
Lb
Fc>C
0
b (2)
C0d>
2
B2
(γTd +γ
E
d Pd)Dd+3γ
T
d
Ld
Fc (3)
C0e>
3
B2
(γTe +γ
E
e Pe)De+4γ
T
e
Le
Fc (4)
B1>
2
3B2 (5)
C0b>
1
B3
(γTb +γ
E
b Pb)Db+5γ
T
b
Lb
Fc (6)
2
B2
(γTe +γ
E
e Pe)De+5γ
T
e
Le
Fc>C
0
e (7)
1
B2
(γTd +γ
E
d Pd)Dd+4γ
T
d
Ld
Fc>C
0
d (8)
B2>B3 (9)
Fig. 2. A cyclic improvement path in a computation offloading game
with non-elastic cloud, 3 APs and 5 MUs. Rows correspond to strategy
profiles, columns to MUs. An arrow between adjacent rows indicates
the MU that performs the improvement step. The cycle consists of
9 improvement steps, and involves some MUs to start and to stop
offloading. The inequalities on the right show the condition under which
the change of strategy is an improvement step.
Starting from the initial strategy profile (1, 2, 1, 0, 0),
Player c revises its strategy to AP 2, which is an im-
provement step if B2 > B1, as shown in inequality (1)
in the figure. Observe that after 9 improvement steps
the players reach the initial strategy profile. For each
step the inequality on the right provides the condition
for being an improvement. It follows from inequalities
(1), (5) and (9) that B2 > B1, B1 > 23B2 and B2 >
B3, respectively. Since, 1B3 (γ
T
b + γ
E
b Pb)Db + 5γ
T
b
Lb
F c >
1
B3
(γTb + γ
E
b Pb)Db + 3γ
T
b
Lb
F c holds, from inequalities (2)
and (6) follows that B3 > 12B2. Combining inequalities
(3) and (8) we have that γTd
Ld
F c >
1
B2
(γTd + γ
E
d Pd)Dd.
Similarly, it follows from inequalities (4) and (7) that
γTe
Le
F c >
1
B2
(γTe + γ
E
e Pe)De. Given these constraints, an
instance of the example can be formulated easily.
An important consequence of the cycle in the improve-
ment path is that the computation offloading game with
non-elastic cloud does not allow a potential function, and
thus Corollary 1 cannot be applied. Yet, as we now show,
NE always exist.
Theorem 2. The computation offloading game with non-
elastic cloud possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We use induction in the number K of players
in order to prove the theorem, and we denote by K(t) =
t the number of MUs that are involved in the game in
induction step t.
It is clear that for K(1) = 1 there is a NE, in which the
only participating MU plays her best reply d∗k(1). Since
there are no other MUs, d∗(1) is a NE. Observe that
if d∗k(1) = 0, MU k would never have an incentive to
deviate from this decision, because the number of players
that offload will not decrease as more MUs are added.
Otherwise, if MU k decides to offload, her best reply is
given by d∗k(1) = arg maxi∈I Bi.
Assume now that for t− 1 > 0 there is a NE d∗(t− 1).
Upon induction step t one MU enters the game; we refer
to this MU as MU K(t). Let MU K(t) play her best reply
d∗
K(t)
(t) with respect to the NE strategy profile of the MUs
that already participated in induction step t− 1, i.e., with
respect to d−K(t)(t) = d
∗(t − 1). After that, MUs can
perform best improvement steps one at a time starting from
the strategy profile d(t) = (d∗
K(t)
(t), d−K(t)(t)), following
the algorithm shown in Figure 3. We refer to this as the
update phase. In order to prove that there is a NE in
induction step t, in the following we show that the MUs
will perform a finite number of best improvement steps in
the update phase.
Let us define the reluctance to offload via AP i of MU k
in a strategy profile d(t) as ρk(d(t)) =
Cck,i(d(t))
C0k
, and let
us rank the MUs that play the same strategy in decreasing
order of reluctance. We use the triplet (t, l, i) to index
the MU that in step t occupies position l in the ranking
for AP i, i.e., ρ(t,1,i)(d(t)) ≥ ρ(t,2,i)(d(t)) ≥ . . . ≥
ρ(t,ni(d(t)),i)(d(t)). Note that for AP i it is MU (t, 1, i)
that can gain most by changing her strategy among all
MUs k ∈ Oi(d(t)).
Observe that if d∗
K(t)
(t) = 0, then ni(d(t)) = ni(d∗(t−
1)) for every i ∈ I and thus d(t) is a NE. If d∗
K(t)
(t) =
i ∈ I, but none of the MUs want to deviate from their
strategy in d∗(t − 1) then d(t) is a NE. Otherwise, we
can have one or both of the following: (i) for some MUs
k ∈ Oi(d(t)) offloading using AP i is not a best reply
anymore, (ii) for some MUs k ∈ Oj(d(t)) for j ∈ I \{i},
offloading using AP j is not a best reply anymore. Let us
denote by DO→L the set of APs with at least one MU that
wants to deviate from her strategy either for (i) or for (ii).
Observe that case (i) can happen only if ρ(t,1,i)(d(t)) >
ρK(t)(d(t)), as otherwise no MU k ∈ Oi(d(t)) would
be able to gain by changing her strategy from AP i.
Now, since dK(t)(t) = i it follows that
ni(d∗(t−1))+1
Bi
≤
nj(d∗(t−1))+1
Bj
for every j ∈ I \ {i}. Therefore, in case
(i) an MU k ∈ Oi(d(t)) cannot decrease her offloading
cost by choosing another AP j; as an improvement step
she would change her strategy to local computing. Let
now MU (t, 1, i) perform an improvement step, and let
us denote the resulting strategy profile by d′(t) (Line 4).
Since MU (t, 1, i) changed from AP i to local computa-
tion, ni(d′(t)) = ni(d∗(t−1)) would hold for every i ∈ I
and d′(t) would be a NE.
Let us now consider case (ii). The only reason why case
(ii) could happen is that the number of players that offload
was incremented, i.e., n(d(t)) = n(d∗(t−1))+1. Thus, the
best improvement of every MU k ∈ Oj(d(t)) that wants
to deviate would be to perform the computation locally.
Among all MUs that would like to deviate, let us choose
the MU with highest reluctance ρk(d(t)) (note that this
is MU (t, 1, j) for some j 6= i), and let her perform the
improvement step, i.e., change to local computation (Lines
9− 12). Let the resulting strategy profile be d′(t). Due to
this improvement step nj(d′(t)) = nj(d∗(t− 1))− 1, and
thus some MUs may be able to decrease their cost by
connecting to AP j. If there is no MU k ∈ K \ O(d′(t))
that would like to start offloading, then there is no more
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Update phase
1: if i ∈ DO→L then
2: /* Corresponds to case (i) */
3: Let k′ ← (t, 1, i)
4: Let d′(t) = (0, d−k′(t))/* Best reply by MU k′ */
5: else if j ∈ DO→L then
6: /* Corresponds to case (ii) */
7: Let d′(t) = d(t)
8: while DO→L 6= ∅ do
9: j ← arg max
j′∈DO→L
ρ(t,1,j′)(d′(t))
10: /* AP with MU with highest reluctance */
11: Let k′ ← (t, 1, j)
12: Let d′(t) = (0, d′−k′(t))
13: /* Best reply by MU (t, 1, j) */
14: DL→O = {k|d′k(t) = 0, C0k ≥ Cck,j(d′(t))}
15: if DL→O 6= ∅ then
16: k′ ← arg max
k∈DL→O
C0k
17: /*MU with highest local cost*/
18: Let d′(t) = (j, d′−k′(t))
19: /* Best reply by MU k′ */
20: DO→L={j∈I|∃k∈Oj(d′(t)), Cck,j(d′(t))≥C0k}
21: else
22: DO→O = {i|i ∈ I \ {j}, nj(d
′(t))+1
Bj
<ni(d
′(t))
Bi
}
23: while DO→O 6= ∅ do
24: i← arg max
i′∈DO→O
ρ(t,1,i′)(d′(t))
25: /* AP with MU with highest reluctance */
26: Let k′ ← (t, 1, i)
27: Let d′(t) = (j, d′−k′(t))
28: /* Best reply by MU (t, 1, i) */
29: Let j ← i
30: DO→O = {i|i ∈ I \ {j}, nj(d
′(t))+1
Bj
<ni(d
′(t))
Bi
}
31: end while
32: end if
33: end while
34: end if
Fig. 3. Pseudo code of the update phase of the distributed algorithm.
MU that would like to stop offloading either because
n(d′(t)) = n(d∗(t − 1)) − 1. Otherwise, among all MUs
k ∈ K \ O(d′(t)) that would like to start offloading, let
MU k′ with highest local computing cost C0k′ perform an
improvement step, i.e., connect to AP j. We now repeat
these steps starting from Line 8 until no more MU wants
to stop offloading. This iteration will stop after a finite
number of steps, as the MU that stops offloading always
has higher reluctance than that one that replaces it, and the
number of MUs is finite. Let j be the AP that the last MU
that stopped offloading was connected to. If the last MU
that stopped offloading was replaced by an MU that did
not offload before, then we reached a NE. Otherwise some
MUs may want to change to AP j. By Lemma 2 if we
only allow MUs to change between APs, we terminate in a
finite number of improvement steps. Now, no MU wants
to stop offloading, and no MU wants to start offloading
either, because they did not want to do so before the MUs
were allowed to change APs. Hence we reached a NE,
which proves the inductive step.
As we next show, the above constructive proof provides
a low complexity algorithm for computing a Nash equi-
librium of the game.
Proposition 3. For the computation offloading game with
non-elastic cloud, when player K(t) enters the game in
equilibrium d∗(t − 1), a new Nash equilibrium can be
computed in O(K(t) + I) time.
Proof: Let us consider inductive step t in which MU
K(t) enters the game. From the proof of Theorem 2 it
follows that if d∗
K(t)
(t) = 0, or if d∗
K(t)
(t) = i ∈ I but
none of the MUs want to deviate from their strategy in
d∗(t− 1), then a NE is reached without any update steps.
If d∗
K(t)
(t) = i ∈ I and case (i) happens, a NE is reached
after one update step. Now let us consider that d∗
K(t)
(t) =
i ∈ I and case (ii) happens. Note that from Theorem 2 it
follows that case (ii) can happen only if I > 1. In what
follows we characterize the longest sequences of update
steps that lead to a NE for the case when K(t) is even and
when it is odd.
If K(t) is even, the worst case scenario is when
|O(d∗(t − 1))| = dK(t)−12 e and ni(d∗(t − 1)) = 0, in
the new strategy profile d(t) every MU k ∈ O(d∗(t− 1))
wants to change to local computing, and when MU k with
highest reluctance ρk(d(t)) changes to local computing,
all MUs k ∈ K \ O(d∗(t − 1)), i.e., a total of bK(t)−12 c
MUs would like to start offloading. In the corresponding
sequence of update steps that leads to a NE, in the first
2bK(t)−12 c + 1 update steps all MUs k ∈ O(d∗(t − 1))
stop to offload and all MUs k ∈ K \O(d∗(t− 1)) start to
offload, and in the next (I − 1) update steps (I − 1) MUs
change between APs. Therefore, a NE is reached after at
most 2bK(t)−12 c+ 1 + (I − 1) update steps.
If K(t) is odd, the worst case scenario is when ni(d∗(t−
1)) = 1, in the new strategy profile d(t) a total of
bK(t)−12 c MUs of the |O(d∗(t − 1))| = bK
(t)−1
2 c + 1
MUs that offload want to change to local computing, and
when MU k with highest reluctance ρk(d(t)) changes to
local computing, all MUs k ∈ K \ O(d∗(t − 1)), i.e., a
total of bK(t)−12 c − 1 MUs would like to start offloading.
Following the same reasoning as above, we obtain that a
NE is reached after at most 2(bK(t)−12 c−1) + 1 + (I−1)
update steps.
Consider now that we add players one at a time, we
then obtain the following bound on the complexity of
computing a NE.
Corollary 2. A Nash equilibrium of the computation
offloading game with non-elastic cloud can be computed
in O(K2 +KI) time.
So far we have shown that starting from a NE and
adding a new player, a new NE can be computed. We now
show a similar result for the case when a player leaves.
Theorem 4. Consider the computation offloading game
with non-elastic cloud, and assume the system is in a NE.
If an existing player leaves the game and the remaining
players play best replies, they converge to a Nash equilib-
rium after a finite number of updates.
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Proof: Let us consider that player k leaves the game,
when the system is in a NE. If the strategy of player k
is to perform local computation, none of the remaining
players would be affected when player k leaves. If the
strategy of player k is to offload using one of the APs, we
can consider player k as a player that after changing his
strategy from offloading to local computing, would have
no incentive to offload again. Recall from the proof of
Theorem 2 that when a player changes her strategy from
offloading to local computing the game converges to a
Nash equilibrium after a finite number of updates. This
proves the theorem.
Observe that Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 allow for effi-
cient computation of equilibrium system operation if the
time between user arrivals and departures is sufficient to
compute a new equilibrium. Furthermore, the computation
can be done in a decentralized manner, by letting MUs
perform best improvements one at a time. The advantage
of such a decentralized implementation could be that MUs
do not have to reveal their parameters.
V. PRICE OF ANARCHY
We have so far shown that NE exist and provided
low complexity algortihms for computing a NE. We now
address the important question how far the system perfor-
mance would be from optimal in a NE. To quantify the
difference from the optimal performance we use the price
of anarchy (PoA), defined as the ratio of the worst case
NE cost and the minimal cost
PoA =
max
d∗
∑
k∈K Ck(d
∗)
min
d∈D
∑
k∈K Ck(d)
. (19)
In what follows we give an upper bound on the PoA.
Theorem 5. The price of anarchy for the computation
offloading game is upper bounded by∑
k∈K C
0
k∑
k∈Kmin{C0k , ¯Cck,1, ..., ¯Cck,I}
,
both in the case of elastic cloud and in the case of non-
elastic cloud.
Proof: First we show that if there is a NE in which
all players perform local computation then it is the worst
case NE. To show this let d∗ be an arbitrary NE. Observe
that Ck(d∗k, d
∗
−k) ≤ C0k holds for every player k ∈ K.
Otherwise, if ∃k ∈ K such that Ck(d∗k, d∗−k) > C0k , player
k would have an incentive to deviate from decision d∗k,
which contradicts our initial assumption that d∗ is a NE.
Thus in any NE
∑
k∈K Ck(d
∗
k, d
∗
−k) ≤
∑
k∈K C
0
k holds,
and if all players performing local computation is a NE
then it is the worst case NE.
Now we derive a lower bound for the optimal solution
of the computation offloading game in the case of both
the elastic and non-elastic cloud. Let us consider an
arbitrary decision profile (dk, d−k) ∈ D. If dk = 0,
then Ck(dk, d−k) = C0k . Otherwise, if dk = i for some
i ∈ I, we have that in the best case dk′ = 0 for
every k′ ∈ K \ {k}, and thus n(d) = 1. Therefore,
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Fig. 6. Number of iterations vs. number of users K for the elastic
and non-elastic cloud, I =10, 50 and 100. The results shown are the
averages of 100 simulations, together with 95% confidence intervals.
Rik(dk, d−k) ≤ Bi and F ck ≤ F c, which implies that
Cck,i(dk, d−k) = (γ
T
k + γ
E
k Pk)
Dk
Rik(dk, d−k)
+ γTk
Lk
F ck
≥ (γTk + γEk Pk)
Dk
Bi
+ γTk
Lk
F c
= ¯Cck,i.
Hence, we have Ck(dk, d−k) ≥ min{C0k , ¯Cck,1, ..., ¯Cck,I}
and
∑
k∈K Ck(dk, d−k)≥
∑
k∈Kmin{C0k , ¯Cck,1, ..., ¯Cck,I}.
Using these we can establish the following bound
PoA=
max
d∗
∑
k∈KCk(d
∗)
min
d∈D
∑
k∈KCk(d)
≤
∑
k∈KC
0
k∑
k∈Kmin{C0k , ¯Cck,1,..., ¯Cck,I}
,
which proves the theorem.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We use simulations to evaluate the cost performance
and the computational time of the proposed distributed
algorithms.
A. Evaluation Scenario
In all configurations, we consider that the bandwidth of
each AP is drawn from a normal distribution with mean
µ = 5 MHz and standard deviation of 0.2µ. The param-
eters <Dk, Lk> that characterize the computation tasks,
the computational capability of MU F 0k and the weights
attributed to energy consumption γEk and the time it takes
to finish the computation γTk were drawn from a con-
tinuous uniform distribution with parameters [0.42, 2]Mb,
[0.1, 0.8] Gigacycles, [0.5, 1] Gigacycles, [0, 1] and [0, 1],
respectively. The consumed energy per CPU cycle vk was
set to 10−11(F 0k )
2 according to measurements reported
in [4], [16]. The data transmit power Pk was set to 0.4W
according to [17]. In the case of the non-elastic cloud,
the computation capability of the cloud F c was set to
100 Gigacycles [18] and in the case of the elastic cloud
each MU that offloads receives F ck = 100 Gigacycles
amount of computing power.
In order to evaluate the cost performance of the equi-
librium strategy profile d∗ computed by the proposed
distributed algorithms, we computed the optimal strat-
egy profile d¯ that minimizes the total cost, i.e., d¯ =
arg mind
∑
k∈K Ck(d). Furthermore, as a baseline for
comparison we use the system cost that can be achieved
in the strategy profile in which all MUs execute their
computation tasks locally, which coincides with the bound
on the PoA.
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B. Price of Anarachy
Figure 4 shows the cost ratio C(d∗)/C(d¯) in the case
of the elastic as well as in the case of the non-elastic
cloud. To make the computation of the optimal strategy
profile d¯ feasible, we considered a scenario with I = 3
APs and we show the cost ratio C(d∗)/C(d¯) as a function
of the number of MUs. Figure 4 shows that the results
reached by the algorithms are close to the optimal results
and the difference between the elastic cloud case and the
non-elastic cloud case is negligible. Furthermore, we can
observe that the cost ratio increases slightly up to K = 6
MUs and from that point it remains fairly unchanged. This
is due to the number of MUs that choose to offload, as we
will see later. The upper bound on the PoA, which is also
shown in Figure 4, additionally confirms that the proposed
distributed algorithms perform good in terms of the cost
ratio. It is interesting to note that the gap between the PoA
bound and the actual cost ratio decreases with increasing
number of MUs.
To get insight into the structure of the equilibrium
strategy profile d∗ computed by the distributed algorithms,
we compare the number of MUs that offload in equilibrium
and the number of MUs that offload in the optimal
strategy profile d¯, by computing the offloading difference
ratio (n(d∗) − n(d¯))/K. Figure 5 shows the offloading
difference ratio corresponding to the results shown in
Figure 4. The results show that the offloading difference
ratio is fairly small in the case of the elastic cloud as well
as in the case of the non-elastic cloud. As the number of
MUs increases, the offloading difference ratio increases
too, which explains the increased cost ratio observed in
Figure 4, as more offloaders reduce the achievable rate,
which in turn leads to increased costs. The observation that
the number of MUs that offload is higher in equilibrium
than in the optimal solution is consistent with the theory
of the tragedy of the commons in economic theory [19].
C. Computational Complexity
In order to evaluate the computational complexity of
the proposed algorithms, we study the number of itera-
tions needed to compute the strategy profile d∗ for three
scenarios with I = 10, 50, 100 APs, respectively. For the
elastic cloud the number of iterations is the number of
update steps, while for the non-elastic cloud the number of
iterations is the sum of the update steps over all induction
steps. Figure 6 shows the number of iterations as a function
of the number of MUs. For the non-elastic cloud we
consider two orderings of adding MUs: in the first case
the MUs are added in random order, while in the second
case the MUs enter the game in increasing order of their
ratio Dk
C0kLk
. In both cases we use the same simulation
scenarios in order to compute the number of the iterations.
Intuitively, we can expect that the second case results in
a smaller number of the iterations, since the MUs with
lower Dk
C0kLk
ratio have higher computational capability
to execute computationally more demanding tasks with
smaller offloading data size than the MUs with higher
Dk
C0kLk
ratio. However, the simulation results show that the
number of iterations is fairly insensitive to the order of
adding the MUs and mostly depends on the number of
MUs K. This insensitivity allows for the implementation
of a very low-overhead decentralized solution, as the
coordinator need not care about the order in which the
MUs are added for computing the equilibrium allocation.
VII. RELATED WORK
There is a significant body of works that deals with
the design of energy efficient computation offloading for
a single mobile user [3], [4], [6], [20], [21], [13], [22].
The experimental results in [21] showed that significant
battery power savings can be achieved by computation
offloading. [6] studied the commmunication overhead of
computation offloading and the impact of bandwidth avail-
ability on an experimental platform. [3] proposed a
code partitioning solution for fine-grained energy-aware
computation offloading. [13] proposed an algorithm for
offloading partitioned code under bandwidth and delay
constraints. [4] proposed CPU frequency and transmission
power adaptation for energy-optimal computation offload-
ing under delay constraints. [22] modeled the offloading
problem under stochastic task arrivals as a Markov deci-
sion process and provided a near-optimal offloading policy.
A number of recent works considered the problem of
joint energy minimization for multiple mobile users [8],
[23], [9]. [8] studies computation partitioning for stream-
ing data processing with the aim of maximizing through-
put, considering sharing of computation instances among
multiple mobile users, and proposes a genetic algorithm
as a heuristic for solving the resulting optimization prob-
lem. [23] models computation offloading to a tiered
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cloud infrastructure under user mobility in a location-
time workflow framework, and proposes a heuristic for
minimizing the users’ cost. [9] aims at minimizing the
mobile users’ energy consumption by joint allocation of
radio resources and cloud computing power, and provides
an iterative algorithm to find a local minimum of the
optimization problem.
A few recent works provided a game theoretic treat-
ment of computation offloading in a game theoretical
setting [24], [25], [7], [26], [27], [28]. [24] considers a
two-stage problem, where first each mobile user decides
what share of its task to offload so as to minimize its
energy consumption and to meet its delay deadline, and
then the cloud allocates computational resources to the
offloaded tasks. [25] considers a two-tier cloud infrastruc-
ture and stochastic task arrivals and proves the existence
of equilibria and provides an algorithm for computing and
equilibrium. [27] considers tasks that arrive simultane-
ously, a single wireless link, and elastic cloud, and show
the existence of equilibria when all mobile users have the
same delay budget. Our work differs from [24] in that we
consider that the allocation of cloud resources is known to
the mobile users, from [25] in that we take into account
contention in the wireless access, and from [27] in that we
consider multiple wireless links and a non-elastic cloud.
Most related to our work are the problems considered
in [7], [26], [28]. [7] considers contention on a single
wireless link and an elastic cloud, assumes upload rates to
be determined by the Shannon capacity of an interference
channel, and shows that the game is a potential game. [26]
extends the model to multiple wireless links and shows that
the game is still a potential game. Unlike these works, we
consider fair bandwidth sharing and consider the case of
non-elastic cloud. [28] considers multiple wireless links,
fair bandwidth sharing and a non-elastic cloud, and claims
the game to have an exact potential. In our work we on the
one hand extend the model to an elastic cloud, on the other
hand we show that an exact potential cannot exist in case
of a non-elastic cloud, but at the same time we prove the
existence of an equilibrium allocation, provide an efficient
algorithm with quadratic complexity for computing one,
and provide a bound on the price of anarchy.
Besides providing efficient algorithms for computing
equilibria, the importance of our contribution lies in the
fact that while games with an elastic cloud are player-
specific singleton congestion games for which the exis-
tence of equilibria is known [29], the non-elastic cloud
model does not fall in this category of games and thus no
general equilibrium existence result exists.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have considered the problem of computation of-
floading in a multi-access wireless network by self-
interested mobile users for mobile cloud computing, for
the case of elastic and non-elastic cloud resources. We
provided a game theoretical formulation of the problem,
and showed that in the case of an elastic cloud a simple
algorithm, in which users iteratively improve their allo-
cations, can be used for computing an equilibrium. We
showed that the same algorithm may fail in the case of
a non-elastic cloud, but also showed that an equilibrium
always exists, and provided an algorithm for computing
an equilibrium with quadratic complexity. Finally, we
provided a bound on the price of anarchy. Simulation
results show that the complexity bound is not tight, and the
proposed algorithm scales better than quadratic in terms of
the number of users, and the obtained equilibria provide
good system performance.
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